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Democracy loses in India's considered silence on Burmese democratic protests
By Tufail Ahmad
Posted: October 29, 2007
India, the world's largest democracy and a rapidly emerging economic power, has faltered twice on the
democratic principle in a short time. Nepal and Burma are two cases where New Delhi's involvement with
despotic regimes has come under international scrutiny, seen in its considered inability to support the
democratic expectations of people in its neighbourhood. Before I outline why India, as an emerging great
power, needs to re-think its foreign-policy framework in terms of its growing weight in international relations,
let's first see what makes New Delhi forgo principle in favour of realpolitik.
First, during the 2006 popular movement against dismissal of the Nepalese parliament by King Gyanendra,
the Indian leadership, instead of calling for restoration of Nepalese democracy, dug up an ex-royal and
quaint-looking member of the ruling Congress party Karan Singh to despatch to Kathmandu to broker peace.
For the Nepalese people, who habitually hear of success stories of Indian democracy in their neighbourhood,
the world's largest democracy was adding insult by sending an 'ex-royal'. All they were expecting was that
New Delhi issue a statement in support of Nepal's fledgling democracy.
Second, as the thousands of Buddhist monks marched peacefully in the streets of Burma this September, the
Indian leadership chose to remain silent. A number of protests were also organised in New Delhi in support
of the Burmese monks but India's ruling politicians stayed way. Not just that. As the monks were braving the
Burmese soldiers in the last weeks of September and early October, India's Minister for Petroleum and
Natural Gas Murli Deora went ahead with his trip to Burma to sign a gas-exploration deal.
During the 1988 protests in Burma, India had stood firmly in favour of Burmese democracy. India was not
seen as an emerging power then, yet it supported the Burmese democratic movement. However, this time
India's silence was disappointing: both to the Indian people and to the outside world. India is now an
emerging power and there are growing expectations worldwide from New Delhi to play a consequential role
in international fora. (An example of how expectations from India have grown was evident recently when the
Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, called for India to be invited to the Middle East peace conference being
sponsored by the United States). However under the leadership of economist Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, India's foreign-policy priorities have changed. More than anything else, it now needs trade and gas.
There are two noticeable trends in terms of the thinking that drives India's foreign policy: it adopts what can be
described as a 'Gandhian' approach to international relations whenever it interacts with the West the US,
Britain, the EU whereas it opts for a pragmatic approach when it deals with authoritarian regimes, with Nepal
and Burma being two immediate examples. Both the approaches are designed to work for the national
interests of India. When adopting the former approach, Indian foreign policymakers speak of justice, equality
and parity in international relations, evident as for example in the global trade talks with the EU and the US. In
the case of the latter, an Indian policymaker forgets all these values in the name of realpolitik, as evident in its
recent responses in the cases of Nepal and Burma.
In both the cases of Nepal and Burma, India has been confronted by a strong Chinese presence. Both these
countries are present in Nepal and Burma for regional-security reasons but in the case of Burma, their
primary interests is in its natural resources. This also means that the revenue through gas and oil exploration
deals props up the Burmese military junta. The country has been under military rule for the past about half a
century and its best-known democracy advocate and Nobel Peace prize winner Miss Aung San Suu Kyi has
been under house arrest for most of past 12 years. When the Buddhist monks led the protests, the world
expected India to do more than simply remain silent.
The international community, mainly the US, Britain and the EU, reacted promptly urging the Burmese military
not to act against the monks and start talking to Miss Suu Kyi to bring about a democratic change. However,
the military rulers do not have a stake and are unlikely to listen to the international community. They have an
economic stake in Chinese and Indian deals and therefore are more likely to be influenced by these two
countries. China did not do much, except for calling on the military junta to maintain restraint. The worst
offender was India which dithered for several weeks. Only when the Indian media became vocal in its
criticism of New Delhi's 'approach' on Burma did the government break silence, urging the Burmese military
junta to engage with Miss Suu Kyi.
This lack of coherent foreign-policy response from New Delhi on an international issue of vital interest throws
light on Indian diplomats' confused understanding of India's role in the fast-changing world affairs. The 2006
Maoist protests in Nepal and the 2007 Buddhist protests in Burma are illustrative of Indian foreign-policy
specialists' lack of clarity of India's growing weight in international relations and concomitant expectations
from the international community. A choice for India is not to forego either of the two approaches discussed
above, nor even to prioritise one above the other. A clear framework will be a combination of the two
approaches: supporting the humanity's ideals of democracy and justice and achieving them through
considerations of pragmatism.
Within such a framework, a logical reaction from New Delhi on the Burmese protests should have been to
send its senior diplomats to Beijing to convince the Chinese to work jointly to pressure Burma's military
generals to enter talks with Miss Suu Kyi. China understands the benefit of working with India in Burma. An
Indian commentator recently noted that Beijing would have little space to manoeuvre should New Delhi adopt
a stance on Burma.
China and India both have the necessary muscle and goodwill to influence the Burmese generals to
understand that in the 21st century, pro-democracy leaders such as Miss Suu Kyi cannot be kept out of
politics. India could gain the experience of working together with Chinese diplomats in the international arena.
India and China could convince Burma that it re-claim its place in the international community: Burmese
representative at the United Nations U Thant served as its UN Secretary General for a decade from 1961 to
1971. Faced with American and European sanctions, Burmese generals would be willing to understand the
benefits of being part of the international community. India could better its own record: it allowed Radio Free
Burma to function from its soil during the 1980s. It would have received international support and wide
acclaim for a considered response than silence.
Before leaving for Rangoon, India's Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Murli Deora was met by protesters in
New Delhi carrying placards which read, 'Mr. Deora don't go for gas, go for democracy'. Nobody expected the
Indian minister to cancel his trip to Rangoon. This is an optimistic moment for India internationally. The world
expects India not to forego its interest in the international relations, but to go for it. A democratic Burma will be
in India's long-term interest and for New Delhi to act, it's never too late.
### ### ###
This article was originally written for the Henry Jackson Society, London.
By Tufail Ahmad
Posted: October 29, 2007
India, the world's largest democracy and a rapidly emerging economic power, has faltered twice on the
democratic principle in a short time. Nepal and Burma are two cases where New Delhi's involvement with
despotic regimes has come under international scrutiny, seen in its considered inability to support the
democratic expectations of people in its neighbourhood. Before I outline why India, as an emerging great
power, needs to re-think its foreign-policy framework in terms of its growing weight in international relations,
let's first see what makes New Delhi forgo principle in favour of realpolitik.
First, during the 2006 popular movement against dismissal of the Nepalese parliament by King Gyanendra,
the Indian leadership, instead of calling for restoration of Nepalese democracy, dug up an ex-royal and
quaint-looking member of the ruling Congress party Karan Singh to despatch to Kathmandu to broker peace.
For the Nepalese people, who habitually hear of success stories of Indian democracy in their neighbourhood,
the world's largest democracy was adding insult by sending an 'ex-royal'. All they were expecting was that
New Delhi issue a statement in support of Nepal's fledgling democracy.
Second, as the thousands of Buddhist monks marched peacefully in the streets of Burma this September, the
Indian leadership chose to remain silent. A number of protests were also organised in New Delhi in support
of the Burmese monks but India's ruling politicians stayed way. Not just that. As the monks were braving the
Burmese soldiers in the last weeks of September and early October, India's Minister for Petroleum and
Natural Gas Murli Deora went ahead with his trip to Burma to sign a gas-exploration deal.
During the 1988 protests in Burma, India had stood firmly in favour of Burmese democracy. India was not
seen as an emerging power then, yet it supported the Burmese democratic movement. However, this time
India's silence was disappointing: both to the Indian people and to the outside world. India is now an
emerging power and there are growing expectations worldwide from New Delhi to play a consequential role
in international fora. (An example of how expectations from India have grown was evident recently when the
Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, called for India to be invited to the Middle East peace conference being
sponsored by the United States). However under the leadership of economist Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh, India's foreign-policy priorities have changed. More than anything else, it now needs trade and gas.
There are two noticeable trends in terms of the thinking that drives India's foreign policy: it adopts what can be
described as a 'Gandhian' approach to international relations whenever it interacts with the West the US,
Britain, the EU whereas it opts for a pragmatic approach when it deals with authoritarian regimes, with Nepal
and Burma being two immediate examples. Both the approaches are designed to work for the national
interests of India. When adopting the former approach, Indian foreign policymakers speak of justice, equality
and parity in international relations, evident as for example in the global trade talks with the EU and the US. In
the case of the latter, an Indian policymaker forgets all these values in the name of realpolitik, as evident in its
recent responses in the cases of Nepal and Burma.
In both the cases of Nepal and Burma, India has been confronted by a strong Chinese presence. Both these
countries are present in Nepal and Burma for regional-security reasons but in the case of Burma, their
primary interests is in its natural resources. This also means that the revenue through gas and oil exploration
deals props up the Burmese military junta. The country has been under military rule for the past about half a
century and its best-known democracy advocate and Nobel Peace prize winner Miss Aung San Suu Kyi has
been under house arrest for most of past 12 years. When the Buddhist monks led the protests, the world
expected India to do more than simply remain silent.
The international community, mainly the US, Britain and the EU, reacted promptly urging the Burmese military
not to act against the monks and start talking to Miss Suu Kyi to bring about a democratic change. However,
the military rulers do not have a stake and are unlikely to listen to the international community. They have an
economic stake in Chinese and Indian deals and therefore are more likely to be influenced by these two
countries. China did not do much, except for calling on the military junta to maintain restraint. The worst
offender was India which dithered for several weeks. Only when the Indian media became vocal in its
criticism of New Delhi's 'approach' on Burma did the government break silence, urging the Burmese military
junta to engage with Miss Suu Kyi.
This lack of coherent foreign-policy response from New Delhi on an international issue of vital interest throws
light on Indian diplomats' confused understanding of India's role in the fast-changing world affairs. The 2006
Maoist protests in Nepal and the 2007 Buddhist protests in Burma are illustrative of Indian foreign-policy
specialists' lack of clarity of India's growing weight in international relations and concomitant expectations
from the international community. A choice for India is not to forego either of the two approaches discussed
above, nor even to prioritise one above the other. A clear framework will be a combination of the two
approaches: supporting the humanity's ideals of democracy and justice and achieving them through
considerations of pragmatism.
Within such a framework, a logical reaction from New Delhi on the Burmese protests should have been to
send its senior diplomats to Beijing to convince the Chinese to work jointly to pressure Burma's military
generals to enter talks with Miss Suu Kyi. China understands the benefit of working with India in Burma. An
Indian commentator recently noted that Beijing would have little space to manoeuvre should New Delhi adopt
a stance on Burma.
China and India both have the necessary muscle and goodwill to influence the Burmese generals to
understand that in the 21st century, pro-democracy leaders such as Miss Suu Kyi cannot be kept out of
politics. India could gain the experience of working together with Chinese diplomats in the international arena.
India and China could convince Burma that it re-claim its place in the international community: Burmese
representative at the United Nations U Thant served as its UN Secretary General for a decade from 1961 to
1971. Faced with American and European sanctions, Burmese generals would be willing to understand the
benefits of being part of the international community. India could better its own record: it allowed Radio Free
Burma to function from its soil during the 1980s. It would have received international support and wide
acclaim for a considered response than silence.
Before leaving for Rangoon, India's Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Murli Deora was met by protesters in
New Delhi carrying placards which read, 'Mr. Deora don't go for gas, go for democracy'. Nobody expected the
Indian minister to cancel his trip to Rangoon. This is an optimistic moment for India internationally. The world
expects India not to forego its interest in the international relations, but to go for it. A democratic Burma will be
in India's long-term interest and for New Delhi to act, it's never too late.
### ### ###
This article was originally written for the Henry Jackson Society, London.
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