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Somalia: a fallen state, a terror haven, another story waiting to be written
By Krzys Wasilewski
Posted: Sep 5, 2006
Somalia: a fallen state, a terrorist haven, a hell on earth. But behind all these slogans, what do we
really know about this country in the Horn of Africa? Very little, one could answer after reading Jonathan
Stevenson's Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia.
During the Cold War years, Somalia was a highly desired ally of the both sides of the conflict. As in
every corner of the world, when one country accepted help from the Soviet Union, another country in the
region was bound to welcome US advisors and dollars. Somalia was no exception, being first a
Russian, then an American ally in their crusade for a better – communist or capitalist – world. When the
Iron Curtain fell down, fond and respected partners became troublesome clients demanding money
and support. But then nobody would listen to them.
In 1991 Siad Barre, Somalia's long-time president and America's favourite, had to flee the country
when powerful clans rebelled against him and took control over the capital Mogadishu. Soon it turned
out that to rule a country is a great deal more difficult than to kill and rape. With no central government,
no police and army, Somalia turned into a tinderbox with 300,000 people killed and over a million
facing a danger of starvation.
The growing international pressure made President George Bush send the Marines to Somalia in
order to maintain peace and deliver humanitarian aid. The operation, Restore Hope, began on
December 3, 1991 and lasted for six months. At first, the Americans managed to stabilize Mogadishu
and the nearest neighbourhood, but then, the clans struck back. The capital once again became a
battlefield where no one could feel safe. Most of the humanitarian aid -- either stolen by gangs or
delivered to the wrong places – never reached ordinary people.
The UN forces as well as the Marines were constantly attacked and forced to close themselves in
their fortress-like camps. The majority of the attacks were conducted by one clan – Habr Gidr, led by a
French-educated warlord, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. Few weeks passed when Aidid became world's
most wanted criminal, with a $3 million bounty on his head. The American high command made the
hunt priority demanding raids whenever it thought possible. In one of such raids, on October 3, 1993,
at the very heart of Mogadishu, the US forces found themselves in a regular battle with Aidid's
militants. At dusk, 19 Marines were killed and almost 1,000 Somalis, dozens of innocent children
and women among them.
The next day TV stations from around the globe broadcast bloodcurdling pictures of American soldiers'
corpses desecrated on the streets of Mogadishu, greeted by rapturous applause from ordinary
Somalis. The vision of Vietnam loomed large and President Bill Clinton ordered to withdrew the
remaining US forces. Thirteen years later, as a part of the War on Terror, President George W Bush
had no objections to supporting the former enemy when it turned out that the clans might be
overthrown by Al Qaeda-linked Islamic forces.
Jonathan Stevenson argues that those calamities could have been avoided had the West tried to
understand Somalia better. Its original sin was, according to the author, underestimating Somalia's
spirit and national identity. That rival clans hate one another is true, but foreigners they hate more. “The
clan is the only palpable political entity the Somali knows. It is essential unit of Somali culture. (...) A
Somali proverb nicely captures the uneasy nature of clan bonds: 'Me and my clan against the world;
me and my brother against the clan; me against my brother.'”
The US forces landing in Somalia, found themselves in a completely unknown environment, with
problems they had never been trained to cope with.
Somalia would not be what it is now, had it not been for the Cold War rivalry between the United States
and Soviet Union, argues Stevenson. The two empires were jockeying for each single scrap of the
world, shifting alliances whenever they found it suitable. No otherwise was in Africa. Stevenson writes:
“The United States took on Somalia as a client in the late seventies, after Siad Barre had engaged his
people in a battle for “greater Somalia” against Ethiopia. (...) Although the Soviet Union had supported
Somalia and built up its military infrastructure, the socialist tilt of Mengistu Haile Mariam and
geographical proximity of Ethiopia to the Middle East proved too tempting for Moscow to pass up. The
Soviet Union abruptly shifted its support from Somalia to Ethiopia.”
The two empires are dear friends now, the animosity between Somalia and Ethiopia have outlived
the Cold War.
When Barre was overthrown in 1991, the US and UN should have engaged forces from Africa instead
of deploying their own unprepared troops. But President George Bush was fighting for reelection and a
“nice, little, victorious war” would have bolstered his chances. Stevenson does not claim that African
forces would have rewritten the history, but, with their knowledge and understanding for local traditions,
they could have prevent Somalia from falling into anarchy.
“Somalia culture is what makes Somalis so singularly unmalleable, so reluctant to take guidance. The
lone but typical exception to the rule is war against a common foe,” Stevenson writes at the beginning
of Losing Mogadishu. No one knows it better than the Americans who instead of restoring hope,
deepened the conflict.
In June 2006, Islamic militias defeated warlords and took control over most of the country. President
George Bush pledged that he would not let Somalia become another Afghanistan. On July 20 this year,
Ethiopia broke into Somalia in order to “protect people and the legal government.” Islamic leaders
have called for jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. The three countries have began to mass soldiers
along the borders. Another story waiting to be written up.
### ### ###
Krzys Wasilewski is a Global Affairs Intern, The Atlantic Affairs.
By Krzys Wasilewski
Posted: Sep 5, 2006
Somalia: a fallen state, a terrorist haven, a hell on earth. But behind all these slogans, what do we
really know about this country in the Horn of Africa? Very little, one could answer after reading Jonathan
Stevenson's Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia.
During the Cold War years, Somalia was a highly desired ally of the both sides of the conflict. As in
every corner of the world, when one country accepted help from the Soviet Union, another country in the
region was bound to welcome US advisors and dollars. Somalia was no exception, being first a
Russian, then an American ally in their crusade for a better – communist or capitalist – world. When the
Iron Curtain fell down, fond and respected partners became troublesome clients demanding money
and support. But then nobody would listen to them.
In 1991 Siad Barre, Somalia's long-time president and America's favourite, had to flee the country
when powerful clans rebelled against him and took control over the capital Mogadishu. Soon it turned
out that to rule a country is a great deal more difficult than to kill and rape. With no central government,
no police and army, Somalia turned into a tinderbox with 300,000 people killed and over a million
facing a danger of starvation.
The growing international pressure made President George Bush send the Marines to Somalia in
order to maintain peace and deliver humanitarian aid. The operation, Restore Hope, began on
December 3, 1991 and lasted for six months. At first, the Americans managed to stabilize Mogadishu
and the nearest neighbourhood, but then, the clans struck back. The capital once again became a
battlefield where no one could feel safe. Most of the humanitarian aid -- either stolen by gangs or
delivered to the wrong places – never reached ordinary people.
The UN forces as well as the Marines were constantly attacked and forced to close themselves in
their fortress-like camps. The majority of the attacks were conducted by one clan – Habr Gidr, led by a
French-educated warlord, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. Few weeks passed when Aidid became world's
most wanted criminal, with a $3 million bounty on his head. The American high command made the
hunt priority demanding raids whenever it thought possible. In one of such raids, on October 3, 1993,
at the very heart of Mogadishu, the US forces found themselves in a regular battle with Aidid's
militants. At dusk, 19 Marines were killed and almost 1,000 Somalis, dozens of innocent children
and women among them.
The next day TV stations from around the globe broadcast bloodcurdling pictures of American soldiers'
corpses desecrated on the streets of Mogadishu, greeted by rapturous applause from ordinary
Somalis. The vision of Vietnam loomed large and President Bill Clinton ordered to withdrew the
remaining US forces. Thirteen years later, as a part of the War on Terror, President George W Bush
had no objections to supporting the former enemy when it turned out that the clans might be
overthrown by Al Qaeda-linked Islamic forces.
Jonathan Stevenson argues that those calamities could have been avoided had the West tried to
understand Somalia better. Its original sin was, according to the author, underestimating Somalia's
spirit and national identity. That rival clans hate one another is true, but foreigners they hate more. “The
clan is the only palpable political entity the Somali knows. It is essential unit of Somali culture. (...) A
Somali proverb nicely captures the uneasy nature of clan bonds: 'Me and my clan against the world;
me and my brother against the clan; me against my brother.'”
The US forces landing in Somalia, found themselves in a completely unknown environment, with
problems they had never been trained to cope with.
Somalia would not be what it is now, had it not been for the Cold War rivalry between the United States
and Soviet Union, argues Stevenson. The two empires were jockeying for each single scrap of the
world, shifting alliances whenever they found it suitable. No otherwise was in Africa. Stevenson writes:
“The United States took on Somalia as a client in the late seventies, after Siad Barre had engaged his
people in a battle for “greater Somalia” against Ethiopia. (...) Although the Soviet Union had supported
Somalia and built up its military infrastructure, the socialist tilt of Mengistu Haile Mariam and
geographical proximity of Ethiopia to the Middle East proved too tempting for Moscow to pass up. The
Soviet Union abruptly shifted its support from Somalia to Ethiopia.”
The two empires are dear friends now, the animosity between Somalia and Ethiopia have outlived
the Cold War.
When Barre was overthrown in 1991, the US and UN should have engaged forces from Africa instead
of deploying their own unprepared troops. But President George Bush was fighting for reelection and a
“nice, little, victorious war” would have bolstered his chances. Stevenson does not claim that African
forces would have rewritten the history, but, with their knowledge and understanding for local traditions,
they could have prevent Somalia from falling into anarchy.
“Somalia culture is what makes Somalis so singularly unmalleable, so reluctant to take guidance. The
lone but typical exception to the rule is war against a common foe,” Stevenson writes at the beginning
of Losing Mogadishu. No one knows it better than the Americans who instead of restoring hope,
deepened the conflict.
In June 2006, Islamic militias defeated warlords and took control over most of the country. President
George Bush pledged that he would not let Somalia become another Afghanistan. On July 20 this year,
Ethiopia broke into Somalia in order to “protect people and the legal government.” Islamic leaders
have called for jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. The three countries have began to mass soldiers
along the borders. Another story waiting to be written up.
### ### ###
Krzys Wasilewski is a Global Affairs Intern, The Atlantic Affairs.
| (c) 2006 New Criterion Foundation, London |
| Security. Ideologies. Multiculturalism. |