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| The Atlantic Affairs Security. Ideologies. Multiculturalism. |
Do we need to understand Chavez's defiance?
By Chloé Saimpert
Posted: March 27, 2005
In December 2001, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez announced the Ley
de Tierras. Despite sharp criticisms from the international and domestic
press and repeated warnings – if not threats – by the international financial
community, he strengthened the law at the start of this year by issuing a
new decree, aimed at speeding up land reform.
The law has two basic objectives against which few people could argue:
reducing the scandalous inequality in the Venezuelan land distribution and
increasing agricultural output. The challenge is to make Venezuela self-
sufficient in foodstuffs, with the objective to double the share of agriculture
in GDP – from 6 percent to 12 percent – by 2007.
Indeed, Venezuela imports today 60 percent to 70 percent of the food it
consumes, and the whole sector has declined dramatically over the
twentieth century despite large amounts of fertile lands with a benign
climate. In addition, in 1998, 60 percent of the land was owned by only one
percent of the population, and smallest landowners – 75 percent of
agricultural holdings – shared only six percent of the land. The government
also argues that a great part of the land is composed of latifundia that are
left idle by the owners.
In order to fulfil these two legitimate objectives, the land reforms consist of
three main measures. First, it sets a maximum legal size for farms, from
100 to 5,000 hectares according to respective productivity. Secondly, it
levies a special tax on any holding that is left more than 80 percent idle.
Finally, and this is the most controversial measure, it allows the
redistribution of certain ‘unproductive’ land to landless peasants who
commit themselves to the cultivation. As a result, any Venezuelan citizen
who is either the head of a family or is between 18 and 25 years old may
apply for a parcel of land and, after three years of cultivation, acquire a title
of ownership to it that can be passed on to descendants, but not sold.
The Ley de Tierras have been highly attacked, largely called as a priori
inefficient and sinful communist reforms, implemented by an undemocratic
government. Yet, no evidence of inefficiency can be brought prior to any
results. Not all social-oriented reform is communist. And the so-called lack
of democracy of the Chavez government is largely spread by powerful
interests that are highly hostile to any change in the share of wealth inside
the country, or to the possibility of any model not based on liberal economic
principles.
Let’s start with the economic side. According to the critiques, the
Venezuelan state is directly threatening the foundation of liberal democracy,
that is private property. But the government has already redistributed 2.2
million of state-owned land before any transfer of private-owned land –
transfer that has not even happened until now. Therefore, what the press
widely claims as ‘communist reforms’ is more about privatization of the
land than nationalization. In addition, concerning private-owned lands, only
high-quality idle land of over 100 hectares or lower quality land of over
5,000 hectares can be expropriated, and this is not proper expropriation
because the lands are to be bought by the state at market value.
Economically speaking, the reforms are based on two ideas that are largely
spread, even among liberals. First, such poverty is morally unacceptable
and, above a certain level, inequalities prevent sustainable economic
growth. Secondly, a lack of domestic competition in the agricultural sector –
due to a quasi-monopoly of the land ownership – leads to lack of
productivity. Rather than a set of so-called communist measures, the land
reform can be seen as a state intervention to allow a better allocation of
resources that will lead eventually to greater productivity in the whole sector,
and finally to economic development and food security in Venezuela. Is it
better – in terms of incentives as well as in terms of economic costs – to
subsidize producers or exports, as it is largely done in Europe and the
United States, or to offer each of the producers land, and commit their
individual responsibility into making it productive?
Next in line is sharp criticism concerning the lack of democracy of the
Chavez government. Yet, no evidence has been brought that the
Venezuelan government is restraining people freedoms in any way. Let’s
say that Hugo Chavez is a former military, and surely a populist, leader. It is
also right that he decided to advertise and implement his reforms in a
revolutionary way. But, no repression has been reported yet, even against
the national press that is highly hostile to reforms. Rather, he enacted a law
to promote and guarantee indigenous and women's rights.
A more accurate reason for the anti-Chavez campaign could be his
constant provoking behavior towards Washington. Indeed, Chavez has sold
oil to Cuba, refused over-flying rights to American military aircraft supplying
‘Plan Colombia’, and questioned the right of the United States to ‘fight
terrorism with terrorism’. As a result, the US government is angry. Colin
Powell has warned him to correct ‘his understanding of what a democracy
is all about’ and the United States has threatened to ‘put Venezuela in
diplomatic isolation’.
Do Western economies really fear their hegemonic power is being
threatened by a small Latin American country? It seems so. Nevertheless,
given the failure of neoliberal policies, economists should be urged to find
a new economic paradigm for developing countries. Chavez’s defiance
against the monopoly of liberal ideas could be a glimmer of hope for the
whole developing world.
### ### ###
Chloé Saimpert reads Global Politics at the London School of Economics
and Political Science.
By Chloé Saimpert
Posted: March 27, 2005
In December 2001, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez announced the Ley
de Tierras. Despite sharp criticisms from the international and domestic
press and repeated warnings – if not threats – by the international financial
community, he strengthened the law at the start of this year by issuing a
new decree, aimed at speeding up land reform.
The law has two basic objectives against which few people could argue:
reducing the scandalous inequality in the Venezuelan land distribution and
increasing agricultural output. The challenge is to make Venezuela self-
sufficient in foodstuffs, with the objective to double the share of agriculture
in GDP – from 6 percent to 12 percent – by 2007.
Indeed, Venezuela imports today 60 percent to 70 percent of the food it
consumes, and the whole sector has declined dramatically over the
twentieth century despite large amounts of fertile lands with a benign
climate. In addition, in 1998, 60 percent of the land was owned by only one
percent of the population, and smallest landowners – 75 percent of
agricultural holdings – shared only six percent of the land. The government
also argues that a great part of the land is composed of latifundia that are
left idle by the owners.
In order to fulfil these two legitimate objectives, the land reforms consist of
three main measures. First, it sets a maximum legal size for farms, from
100 to 5,000 hectares according to respective productivity. Secondly, it
levies a special tax on any holding that is left more than 80 percent idle.
Finally, and this is the most controversial measure, it allows the
redistribution of certain ‘unproductive’ land to landless peasants who
commit themselves to the cultivation. As a result, any Venezuelan citizen
who is either the head of a family or is between 18 and 25 years old may
apply for a parcel of land and, after three years of cultivation, acquire a title
of ownership to it that can be passed on to descendants, but not sold.
The Ley de Tierras have been highly attacked, largely called as a priori
inefficient and sinful communist reforms, implemented by an undemocratic
government. Yet, no evidence of inefficiency can be brought prior to any
results. Not all social-oriented reform is communist. And the so-called lack
of democracy of the Chavez government is largely spread by powerful
interests that are highly hostile to any change in the share of wealth inside
the country, or to the possibility of any model not based on liberal economic
principles.
Let’s start with the economic side. According to the critiques, the
Venezuelan state is directly threatening the foundation of liberal democracy,
that is private property. But the government has already redistributed 2.2
million of state-owned land before any transfer of private-owned land –
transfer that has not even happened until now. Therefore, what the press
widely claims as ‘communist reforms’ is more about privatization of the
land than nationalization. In addition, concerning private-owned lands, only
high-quality idle land of over 100 hectares or lower quality land of over
5,000 hectares can be expropriated, and this is not proper expropriation
because the lands are to be bought by the state at market value.
Economically speaking, the reforms are based on two ideas that are largely
spread, even among liberals. First, such poverty is morally unacceptable
and, above a certain level, inequalities prevent sustainable economic
growth. Secondly, a lack of domestic competition in the agricultural sector –
due to a quasi-monopoly of the land ownership – leads to lack of
productivity. Rather than a set of so-called communist measures, the land
reform can be seen as a state intervention to allow a better allocation of
resources that will lead eventually to greater productivity in the whole sector,
and finally to economic development and food security in Venezuela. Is it
better – in terms of incentives as well as in terms of economic costs – to
subsidize producers or exports, as it is largely done in Europe and the
United States, or to offer each of the producers land, and commit their
individual responsibility into making it productive?
Next in line is sharp criticism concerning the lack of democracy of the
Chavez government. Yet, no evidence has been brought that the
Venezuelan government is restraining people freedoms in any way. Let’s
say that Hugo Chavez is a former military, and surely a populist, leader. It is
also right that he decided to advertise and implement his reforms in a
revolutionary way. But, no repression has been reported yet, even against
the national press that is highly hostile to reforms. Rather, he enacted a law
to promote and guarantee indigenous and women's rights.
A more accurate reason for the anti-Chavez campaign could be his
constant provoking behavior towards Washington. Indeed, Chavez has sold
oil to Cuba, refused over-flying rights to American military aircraft supplying
‘Plan Colombia’, and questioned the right of the United States to ‘fight
terrorism with terrorism’. As a result, the US government is angry. Colin
Powell has warned him to correct ‘his understanding of what a democracy
is all about’ and the United States has threatened to ‘put Venezuela in
diplomatic isolation’.
Do Western economies really fear their hegemonic power is being
threatened by a small Latin American country? It seems so. Nevertheless,
given the failure of neoliberal policies, economists should be urged to find
a new economic paradigm for developing countries. Chavez’s defiance
against the monopoly of liberal ideas could be a glimmer of hope for the
whole developing world.
### ### ###
Chloé Saimpert reads Global Politics at the London School of Economics
and Political Science.
| (c) 2006 The Atlantic Affairs |