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Russian civil society will find it harder to breathe
By Liliana N Proskuryakova
Posted: March 14, 2006
Despite rising foreign criticism of its plan to muzzle civil society
organizations, fear is growing that the Putin government may be
returning to the authoritarianism of the past. What began as a stealthily-
introduced bill to control non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may
end up virtually strangling Russian civil society.
Although the Russian government has periodically cracked down on
dissident news organizations, it has generally been willing to tolerate
the country's thousands of NGOs, many of which criticize government
policy. The sign that its tolerance is disappearing emerged last month
when a group of MPs quietly introduced a bill aimed at tightening the
Kremlin's control over NGOs. Since coming to light, the proposed
legislation has generated an international outcry.
President Bush raised the matter with President Putin during the APEC
summit and early this week U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Burns is believed to have expressed concerns to his counterpart in
Moscow. Yet there is no question that it will be adopted and enforced by
the beginning of 2006, virtually strangling civil society organizations
operating in Russia.
According to the latest data, there are at least 600,000 registered non-
governmental non-commercial organizations in Russia. At least as
many may be working in the country without official registration. The
number of NGOs in Russia has grown rapidly since 1991, and now
includes social service providers, educational organizations, policy
think-tanks, gender-based groups, and credit unions. In addition,
organizations like those representing veterans and disabled people
still remain from the Soviet years. Thus NGOs in Russia, as elsewhere
– fill a number of important civic functions, including advocating for the
marginalized and providing social services where the state can not or
will not. Indeed, President Putin has praised these organizations. At a
2005 meeting with his Advisory Council on Civil Society, he expressed
his hope that “NGOs … may become good and irreplaceable partners
to the state in combating most acute problems.” Yet Putin's public
praise masks a clear distrust for some sectors of civil society.
Many Russian NGOs are actively involved in the promotion of cross-
border initiatives. Some are national branches of international
organizations – Charities Aid Foundation, for example, has an active
office in Moscow. It is these foreign-based organizations that concern
the Putin government. Given the recent pro-democratic “color
revolutions” in several post-Soviet countries, Russian authorities are
particularly worried about those who explicitly advocate in favor of pro-
democratic changes. As the New York Times recently reported, in 2004
the U.S. Government donated $45 million dollars to Russian groups
that promote democracy and civil rights. The bill might have been partly
understandable if it targeted only these suspicious foreign foundations.
However, the suggested changes will affect all NGOs operating in the
country.
The bill will have three primary effects. First, it will limit Russians’
constitutional right to create unregistered but formalized civil society
groups (those with statutes and governing bodies): registration
authorities will have to be notified in all cases. The order of such
notification will be regulated by the decree of the federal Government
and not by law, while the list of reasons for refusal are ample and
unclear.
Secondly, the bill will tighten controls over all existing Russian NGOs.
The government will be able to exercise more control over NGOs’ work
and expenditure, and will be able to ask any organization to provide any
documentation at any time. In addition, each of the hundreds of
thousand of existing NGOs will have to re-register with the authorities.
Given the high level of corruption in Russia, this proposition will leave
ample space for abuse. It will also immediately paralyze the work of
thousands of charity, cultural, youth, social, human rights,
environmental and other organizations.
Thirdly, particularly tough measures will be applied to foreign NGOs
operating in Russia. The bill outlaws affiliates of foreign NGOs, and
requires existing organizations to re-register as exclusively Russian,
which may prove legally impossible. At the same time, foreign citizens
who are not permanent residents of the Russian Federation will not be
able to become founders or members of Russian NGOs.
Despite recent statements by the Russian leadership expressing a
willingness to intensify dialogue with civil society, no consultations or
public discussions of the bill were held with NGOs or other
stakeholders. This is hardly surprising. The USAID Sustainability Index
and CIVICUS Civil Society Index for Russia certify that the external
environment in which NGOs operate in Russia has been confusing,
restrictive and inhospitable. There is a clear contrast between the pro-
civil society rhetoric of the Russian government and the actual
operating environment for Russian NGOs.
Even in the midst of pushing the new restrictions, Russian authorities
are cracking down on civil society in other ways. This fall, President
Putin created the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation. The key
function of the Chamber will be to submit recommendations to Mps
about socially important legislation. Many human rights organizations
have refused to work in the Chamber, calling it the latest Kremlin
attempt to grasp control over NGOs. Parallel to the creation of the
Chamber, Russian executive authorities are busy creating their own
NGOs and grant-making foundations. In place of existing independent
NGOs, the government clearly hopes to create a system of tame civil
society organizations beholden to the state.
In response to these moves, leading Russian civil society
organizations composed a letter of protest “No – to tightening control
over civil society”, which was posted on the web-site “Human Rights in
Russia” http://hro.org/. The current list of supporters includes over 200
major organizations and activists. Moreover, Ella Pamfilova, Head of
the President’s Council on civil society and human rights, Vladimir
Lukin, Russian Human Rights Commissioner, and half of the
appointed members of the Russian Civic Chamber have expressed
opposition to the new Bill. In a letter to the speaker of the State Duma,
US Congressman Chris Smith, chairman of the US Helsinki
Commission, said the planned new law “would have a chilling effect on
civil society in the Russian Federation...and seriously undermine the
rights of individuals in Russia to freedom of association.”
But these protests may be in vain. Because of Putin's strong influence
in the Russian parliament, it seems unlikely that a credible opposition
to the legislation will arise. The parliament today is, according to its
Chair B. Gryzlov, not a place for political debates. Russian NGOs hope
that international organizations and NGOs will step up their opposition
to the Bill. Yet the Kremlin may interpret foreign opposition as an
intrusion into internal affairs and another reason to tighten controls. So
despite national and international opposition, the legislation will likely
become law before the end of the year. The second reading of the Bill is
scheduled for December 9th.
By limiting the constitutional right of association, the bill contradicts the
norms of international law, including the European Convention on
Human Rights and Basic Freedoms ratified by Russia. Thus, the
reputation of Russia as guarantor of international law will be
compromised. This is especially awkward as it comes just a month
before Russia assumes the G8 presidency; the G8 Summit will take
place in St.Petersburg in summer 2006. Even if the restrictions go
forward as planned, Putin's success at home may diminish his
credibility abroad.
### ### ###
Liliana N Proskuryakova is Head of the International Unit at St.
Petersburg Strategy Center. This article is copyrighted by the YaleGlobal
Online, and is published with permission.
By Liliana N Proskuryakova
Posted: March 14, 2006
Despite rising foreign criticism of its plan to muzzle civil society
organizations, fear is growing that the Putin government may be
returning to the authoritarianism of the past. What began as a stealthily-
introduced bill to control non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may
end up virtually strangling Russian civil society.
Although the Russian government has periodically cracked down on
dissident news organizations, it has generally been willing to tolerate
the country's thousands of NGOs, many of which criticize government
policy. The sign that its tolerance is disappearing emerged last month
when a group of MPs quietly introduced a bill aimed at tightening the
Kremlin's control over NGOs. Since coming to light, the proposed
legislation has generated an international outcry.
President Bush raised the matter with President Putin during the APEC
summit and early this week U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Burns is believed to have expressed concerns to his counterpart in
Moscow. Yet there is no question that it will be adopted and enforced by
the beginning of 2006, virtually strangling civil society organizations
operating in Russia.
According to the latest data, there are at least 600,000 registered non-
governmental non-commercial organizations in Russia. At least as
many may be working in the country without official registration. The
number of NGOs in Russia has grown rapidly since 1991, and now
includes social service providers, educational organizations, policy
think-tanks, gender-based groups, and credit unions. In addition,
organizations like those representing veterans and disabled people
still remain from the Soviet years. Thus NGOs in Russia, as elsewhere
– fill a number of important civic functions, including advocating for the
marginalized and providing social services where the state can not or
will not. Indeed, President Putin has praised these organizations. At a
2005 meeting with his Advisory Council on Civil Society, he expressed
his hope that “NGOs … may become good and irreplaceable partners
to the state in combating most acute problems.” Yet Putin's public
praise masks a clear distrust for some sectors of civil society.
Many Russian NGOs are actively involved in the promotion of cross-
border initiatives. Some are national branches of international
organizations – Charities Aid Foundation, for example, has an active
office in Moscow. It is these foreign-based organizations that concern
the Putin government. Given the recent pro-democratic “color
revolutions” in several post-Soviet countries, Russian authorities are
particularly worried about those who explicitly advocate in favor of pro-
democratic changes. As the New York Times recently reported, in 2004
the U.S. Government donated $45 million dollars to Russian groups
that promote democracy and civil rights. The bill might have been partly
understandable if it targeted only these suspicious foreign foundations.
However, the suggested changes will affect all NGOs operating in the
country.
The bill will have three primary effects. First, it will limit Russians’
constitutional right to create unregistered but formalized civil society
groups (those with statutes and governing bodies): registration
authorities will have to be notified in all cases. The order of such
notification will be regulated by the decree of the federal Government
and not by law, while the list of reasons for refusal are ample and
unclear.
Secondly, the bill will tighten controls over all existing Russian NGOs.
The government will be able to exercise more control over NGOs’ work
and expenditure, and will be able to ask any organization to provide any
documentation at any time. In addition, each of the hundreds of
thousand of existing NGOs will have to re-register with the authorities.
Given the high level of corruption in Russia, this proposition will leave
ample space for abuse. It will also immediately paralyze the work of
thousands of charity, cultural, youth, social, human rights,
environmental and other organizations.
Thirdly, particularly tough measures will be applied to foreign NGOs
operating in Russia. The bill outlaws affiliates of foreign NGOs, and
requires existing organizations to re-register as exclusively Russian,
which may prove legally impossible. At the same time, foreign citizens
who are not permanent residents of the Russian Federation will not be
able to become founders or members of Russian NGOs.
Despite recent statements by the Russian leadership expressing a
willingness to intensify dialogue with civil society, no consultations or
public discussions of the bill were held with NGOs or other
stakeholders. This is hardly surprising. The USAID Sustainability Index
and CIVICUS Civil Society Index for Russia certify that the external
environment in which NGOs operate in Russia has been confusing,
restrictive and inhospitable. There is a clear contrast between the pro-
civil society rhetoric of the Russian government and the actual
operating environment for Russian NGOs.
Even in the midst of pushing the new restrictions, Russian authorities
are cracking down on civil society in other ways. This fall, President
Putin created the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation. The key
function of the Chamber will be to submit recommendations to Mps
about socially important legislation. Many human rights organizations
have refused to work in the Chamber, calling it the latest Kremlin
attempt to grasp control over NGOs. Parallel to the creation of the
Chamber, Russian executive authorities are busy creating their own
NGOs and grant-making foundations. In place of existing independent
NGOs, the government clearly hopes to create a system of tame civil
society organizations beholden to the state.
In response to these moves, leading Russian civil society
organizations composed a letter of protest “No – to tightening control
over civil society”, which was posted on the web-site “Human Rights in
Russia” http://hro.org/. The current list of supporters includes over 200
major organizations and activists. Moreover, Ella Pamfilova, Head of
the President’s Council on civil society and human rights, Vladimir
Lukin, Russian Human Rights Commissioner, and half of the
appointed members of the Russian Civic Chamber have expressed
opposition to the new Bill. In a letter to the speaker of the State Duma,
US Congressman Chris Smith, chairman of the US Helsinki
Commission, said the planned new law “would have a chilling effect on
civil society in the Russian Federation...and seriously undermine the
rights of individuals in Russia to freedom of association.”
But these protests may be in vain. Because of Putin's strong influence
in the Russian parliament, it seems unlikely that a credible opposition
to the legislation will arise. The parliament today is, according to its
Chair B. Gryzlov, not a place for political debates. Russian NGOs hope
that international organizations and NGOs will step up their opposition
to the Bill. Yet the Kremlin may interpret foreign opposition as an
intrusion into internal affairs and another reason to tighten controls. So
despite national and international opposition, the legislation will likely
become law before the end of the year. The second reading of the Bill is
scheduled for December 9th.
By limiting the constitutional right of association, the bill contradicts the
norms of international law, including the European Convention on
Human Rights and Basic Freedoms ratified by Russia. Thus, the
reputation of Russia as guarantor of international law will be
compromised. This is especially awkward as it comes just a month
before Russia assumes the G8 presidency; the G8 Summit will take
place in St.Petersburg in summer 2006. Even if the restrictions go
forward as planned, Putin's success at home may diminish his
credibility abroad.
### ### ###
Liliana N Proskuryakova is Head of the International Unit at St.
Petersburg Strategy Center. This article is copyrighted by the YaleGlobal
Online, and is published with permission.
| (c) 2006 New Criterion Foundation, London |